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I want to thank the Law and Religion section of the AALS for 
inviting me to participate in today’s program. It is a privilege to join 
so many distinguished scholars on this panel.
I think today’s topic—Is Secularism a Non-negotiable Aspect 
of Liberal Constitutionalism?—is a challenging one. It invites, 
indeed, it pretty much demands, an inquiry into what liberal 
constitutionalism requires and whether secularism is the exclusive 
foundation for satisfying those requirements.
These questions can be examined at several different levels of 
inquiry. At a fairly abstract level, generalizing above and beyond 
religion–state relationships, many key aspects of liberal 
constitutionalism can be justified by religious sources and beliefs.1
One core idea is that a constitution is an expression by a society of 
collective self-doubt—of the recognition that “we the people” trust 
neither government nor ourselves with state power and need some 
super-majority constraints to hold our worst impulses in check.2 That 
sort of humility in evaluating human nature can certainly be 
grounded in religion. Similarly, the idea of limited government can 
have both religious as well as secular roots.3
The protection of fundamental liberty and equality rights re-
quired by liberal constitutionalism also can be justified by religious 
beliefs. The ideas that all people are created equal in the image of 
Gíd and that they are “endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights” are pretty obviously religious beliefs.4 While 
* Professor of Law Emeritus, U.C. Davis School of Law; J.D., Harvard 
University (1997); B.A., Political Science and Psychology, Antioch College (1969).
1. See Steven M. Tipton, Republic and Liberal State: The Place of 
Religion in an Ambiguous Polity, 39 EMORY L.J. 191, 196-97 (1990).
2. See Gene R. Nichol, Towards a People’s Constitution, 91 CAL. L. REV.
621, 622-23 (2003) (describing distrust of the government and a variety of super-
majority constraints).
3. See Michael W. McConnell, Religion and its Relation to Limited 
Government, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 943, 943-44 (2010).
4. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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religion can be a source of oppression and a justification for massive 
abuses of power, such as the institution of slavery, it was also the 
inspiration of union soldiers singing in the Battle Hymn of the 
Republic, “As [Christ] died to make men holy, let us die to make 
men free.”5
Religion per se isn’t incompatible with constitutional 
constraints to prevent the abuse of power through limited
government and the protection of fundamental liberty and equality 
rights.
We can narrow the inquiry and focus specifically on religion–
state relationships while still operating at a fairly abstract level of 
analysis. What religion–state relationships does liberal 
constitutionalism require? A commitment to religious liberty can be 
grounded in religion.6 Religious beliefs can acknowledge that the 
individual has free will and that religious belief is only meaningful to 
both the individual and to G–d if it is voluntary and uncoerced.7 A
basic conception of the separation of church and state has had, and 
can have, both religious and secular foundations.8
The hardest two questions at this level of analysis are related. 
First, can the constitution or the state declare religious truth while 
acting consistently with liberal constitutional guarantees? Second, 
can the state speak for the entire community, be it a city, state, or 
nation with a religious voice—expressing collective religious 
messages or prayers? I think the answer to these questions in a 
liberal constitutional regime has to be “no.”
I would argue that these are non-negotiable first principles. 
Religious truth cannot be determined by a majority vote in the jury 
5. Julia Ward Howe, The Battle Hymn of the Republic, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Feb. 1862, at 10, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/
flashbks/battlehymn-original.htm [https://perma.cc/CCN6-8X5F] (last visited Mar. 
18, 2017).
6. See, e.g., ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF 
PROTESTANTS (1744); JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 167 (First 
Irvington ed. 1979) (1690).
7. See, e.g., KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN 
AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 84 (2015); JOHN H.
GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 49-51 (1996). 
8. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at amend. 1, at 43 
(Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1987) (1785), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html 
[https://perma.cc/8XFN-DYDZ] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017); ROGER WILLIAMS, THE 
BLOODY TENENT OF PERSECUTION 3-4, 125 (1644). 
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box, in the halls of the legislature, or at the ballot box.9 My 
government usurps power that cannot be vested in it under liberal 
constitutional principles if it asserts the authority to speak to G–d in 
my name.10
But I am not sure that these negative answers require a 
commitment to secularism—although a lot depends on how you 
define secularism.11
Suppose a constitution’s preamble acknowledges that the 
sources of the ideas and commitments expressed in the constitution’s 
language reflect the beliefs of “we the people.” And it goes on to 
explain that “we the people” are a pluralistic community holding 
diverse religious and secular beliefs. The ideas and commitments 
expressed in the constitution are grounded in and resonate with the 
beliefs of many faith traditions and secular understandings. The 
constitution’s shared conclusions have diverse roots. The state 
declares that it is bound by and identifies with core values that are 
grounded in both religious and secular beliefs.
I do not think a statement to this effect in a constitution 
expresses a declaration of religious truth. I would not describe it as a 
commitment to secularism either in that it explicitly acknowledges 
the legitimate role of religious belief in the development of law.12 I
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 90 (1944) (Stone, C.J., 
dissenting); Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 88 (2002)
(“What the state may not do—what [constitutional] doctrine properly forbids it to 
do—is declare any particular religious doctrine to be the true one, or enact laws that 
clearly imply such a declaration of religious truth.”); IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W.
TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 163 (2014) (explaining that 
under our constitutional system, the state “disclaims competence over all religious 
questions, including the existence or nonexistence of God”).
10. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Town of Greece v. Galloway:
Constitutional Challenges to State-Sponsored Prayers at Local Government 
Meetings, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1521, 1529 (2014).
11. Exactly what is meant by secularism remains unclear and is subject to 
various definitions, see for example, JEROEN TEMPERMAN, STATE–RELIGION 
RELATIONSHIPS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A RIGHT TO RELIGIOUSLY 
NEUTRAL GOVERNANCE 111-13 (2010); W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G.
SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 121-22 (2010).
12. The distinction between the government claiming to have a religious 
identity of its own and the government recognizing and acknowledging the diverse 
religious and non-religious beliefs of the people could be the basis for arguing that 
the state is secular. Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle make that argument explicitly 
in explaining the United States religion clause jurisprudence in their thoughtful and 
provocative book. See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 9, at 1-2. I leave for another day a 
discussion of their thesis. For now, I simply suggest that there may be more useful 
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do not think a similar kind of statement in a statute would be a 
declaration of religious truth or an assertion that the statute could 
only be explained in secular terms. The statement would be an 
honest expression of the reality that in a pluralistic polity, law often 
has multiple sources and is, in fact, negotiated among diverse 
constituents and their representatives. 
Here, the state does not claim to recognize or enforce particular 
values because they are religious. It recognizes and enforces 
particular values because they are deemed to be fundamental by the 
people who created that constitution and accepted it as their 
governing law. Some, perhaps a majority, of “the people” hold that 
these values and principles are fundamental because they are 
religious. Others believe these values and commitments deserve 
constitutional recognition for other religious or non-religious 
reasons. All of the diverse sources of values reflecting the varied 
constituents of a pluralistic society that support the constitution’s 
commitments are formally acknowledged without hierarchy, even 
though religion, particularly the majority’s religious beliefs, is in fact 
determinative of the constitutional text.
We can focus the analysis even more narrowly and ask whether 
more specific religion–state relationships are necessary to, consistent 
with, or conducive to the maintenance of a liberal constitutional 
order. Do those necessary relationships require a commitment to 
secularism?
My short answer to the question of what kinds of religion–state
relationships are required by a liberal constitutional order is that the 
range of such relationships is quite broad. This is in part because 
constitutional doctrine in this area often exists to minimize the risk 
that illiberal decisions will be made. The lack of prophylactic 
provisions to minimize such risks in particular circumstances may be 
consistent with liberal constitutionalism if in fact the history and 
culture of a society demonstrate that the risks are not being 
actualized. This risk analysis makes the evaluation of various 
religion–state frameworks highly contextual.
To cite one example, two risks to liberty and equality values 
commonly associated with government funding of religious 
institutions are religious preferentialism in the allocation of funds 
and government intrusions into, and control over, religious
and accurate ways to describe some liberal constitutional regimes in which the state 
lacks an explicit religious identity while recognizing religious beliefs as a source of 
its laws, rather than characterizing the state as secular.
Religion–State Frameworks in Liberal Constitutions 167
institutions receiving state support.13 The weight to be assigned to 
those risks in deciding whether constitutional prohibitions against 
such aid are necessary in a particular polity surely depends in part on 
the extent to which one reasonably determines that either abuse is 
likely to occur.
A second more important reason for recognizing that a broad 
range of religion–state doctrinal choices are consistent with liberal 
constitutionalism is that religion–state relationships are multi-
dimensional; that is, they implicate several constitutionally 
cognizable liberal values. Sometimes these values overlap and 
reinforce each other. Sometimes they are independent and co-exist. 
And sometimes they are in conflict with each other. All religion–
state relationships require the sacrifice and subordination of some of 
these values. There is no win, win, win solution. The weighing and 
fitting together of these values is so complicated and is subject to so 
much reasoned disagreement14 that it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that some reasonable range of frameworks resonates with liberal 
constitutionalism. Of course, some constitutional regimes may 
arguably do a better job than others in promoting and protecting 
liberal values, but that does not warrant characterizing the lesser
regimes as illiberal.
Thus, a liberal constitutional regime’s religion–state doctrine 
will involve something of a patchwork quilt. These various value 
patches and threads may be woven together in different ways. While 
some quilts clearly fall outside of the liberal regime category, many 
13. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Souter Dissent: Correct but Inadequate,
in CHURCH–STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS: DEBATING NEUTRALITY 151, 156-58 
(Stephen V. Monsma ed., 2002); Alan E. Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher 
Programs Through a Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV.
871, 886-88 (1999) [hereinafter School Voucher Programs].
14. See, e.g., School Voucher Programs, supra note 13, at 886-88 
(describing the various constitutional values implicated in religion clause disputes); 
Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The 
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 89 (1990) [hereinafter Harmonizing the Heavenly] (attributing 
part of the difficulty courts experience in adjudicating religion clause issues to the 
multidimensional nature of religion); Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion 
Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis 
of “Neutrality Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 243, 256-57 (1999) [hereinafter Interpreting the Religion Clauses]
(explaining that religion crosses constitutional boundary lines and implicates 
personal liberty, group equality, and freedom of speech).
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others are consistent with this general characterization. There is no 
one fixed mandatory pattern that is required.15
The primary values intrinsically implicated and in play in 
religion–state relationships are liberty, equality, and 
speech/democracy rights: the right to exercise religious worship and 
practice, the right of religious minorities to be free from 
discrimination, and the right to express a religious voice through 
prayer, sermons, proselytizing, and the myriad of other religious 
activities involving speech. Put most simply, religious liberty 
involves the freedom to decide whether or not to hold and adhere to 
religious beliefs and the right to practice the requirements of one’s 
faith.16 Religious equality values can be analogized to norms of racial 
and gender equality in that the focus is on religious identity, not 
belief or conduct.17 For constitutional purposes, members of different 
faiths are of equal worth and are entitled to equal treatment and 
respect.18 Speech/democracy values include both instrumental and 
dignitary interests.19 On the speech side, we recognize the right to 
engage in authentic expressive conduct and the need to minimize 
state distortion of the marketplace of ideas.20 On the democracy side, 
we recognize the right to be part of the consent of the governed 
needed to legitimate government and the right to participate in 
political decision-making.
Difficult questions arise with regard to the recognition, 
affirmation, and protection of all of these values in religion–state
relationships.21 I could not begin to summarize the permutations in 
15. See generally TEMPERMAN, supra note 11 (providing an exemplary 
description and discussion of the range of religion-state relationships that might be 
deemed consistent with liberal constitutionalism).
16. See, e.g., Harmonizing the Heavenly, supra note 14, at 95-102; Alan E. 
Brownstein, The Right Not To Be John Garvey, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 807-08
(1998) (reviewing JOHN. H. GARVEY. WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)).
17. See Harmonizing the Heavenly, supra note 14, at 102-12 (explaining 
how the Equal Protection Clause can cover religious groups as a suspect class). 
18. See, e.g., Harmonizing the Heavenly, supra note 14, at 103-12, 125-54 
(explaining how equality values underlying equal protection principles justify 
protecting the equality interests of religious minorities); Interpreting the Religion 
Clauses, supra note 14, at 256-68 (comparing race and religion for the purpose of 
explaining why the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to prohibit religious 
favoritism just as the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial hierarchy); School 
Voucher Programs, supra note 13, at 902-27.
19. See Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 14, at 268-69.
20. See, e.g., id.
21. See Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1351, 1351-52 (2012).
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fifteen minutes. Instead, I am going to focus on a few illustrative 
areas where I think the requirements of a liberal constitutional 
regime are particularly unclear. 
One currently open and contested question we can ask is 
whether and to what extent religion should be considered to be 
something different—something that requires distinctive treatment—
for liberal constitutional purposes.22 That answer depends in 
significant part on how we choose to characterize various 
understandings of religion and how we weigh and fit together the 
values implicated by these characterizations.
The issue comes up in numerous settings. For example, should 
a liberal constitutional regime impose distinctive constraints on 
government displays or messages endorsing religious precepts? If we 
characterize religion as a viewpoint or voice in the marketplace of 
ideas, the government as a speaker should be free to endorse 
religious beliefs as freely as it does other messages or perspectives. 
There is nothing distinctive about religious messages or secular 
messages as a viewpoint of speech: A religious message is one idea 
among many in the marketplace of ideas.23 The analysis changes 
substantially if we shift our understanding from religion as a 
viewpoint to religion as an identity and class.24 Here, religious 
equality concerns support treating religion differently than other 
ideas or beliefs that we do not recognize as defining a protected 
class.25 For particular classes, liberal equality norms require equal 
treatment with regard to access to material goods and benefits and 
also equality of status and respect. There are arguably expressive 
constraints on what government can say about the legitimacy and 
worth of different religious communities.26 Government speech 
promoting religious hierarchy or supremacy is arguably as 
constitutionally problematic as speech promoting racial or ethnic 
hierarchy or supremacy.27
22. This issue is hotly debated today. See, e.g., id.; BRADY, supra note 7, at 
1-2.
23. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282-88 (White, J., 
dissenting); Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing 
Mandates: Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause 
and Establishment Clause Are Stronger when Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1714-15 (2011) [hereinafter Mutually Reinforcing 
Mandates].
24. See Harmonizing the Heavenly, supra note 14, at 95, 104.
25. See id. at 97.
26. See id. at 110.
27. See id. at 102-12.
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Should a liberal constitutional regime provide distinctive 
treatment to private religious expressive conduct or association? The 
problems here exemplify the complex inter-relationship of the 
multiple values in play in developing religion–state doctrine. From a 
freedom of speech and association perspective, religion is arguably 
indistinguishable from any secular viewpoint, moral perspective, or
political ideology.28 As such, it is a voice in the marketplace of ideas 
and government regulations of religious expression should be subject 
to the same constitutional constraints applicable to the regulation of 
any other viewpoint of expression. In a liberal democracy, that 
would presumably include some limitation on the state’s ability to 
engage in discriminatory regulations that favor or disfavor any 
viewpoint of speech.29 Thus, religion should not be favored or 
disfavored in comparison to the treatment of secular beliefs, 
speakers, or messages.30
Again, the analysis changes if we characterize religion as an 
identity or a distinctive liberty interest and examine state regulations 
through an equality rights or fundamental liberty rights perspective. 
Part of the problem here is that so many core religious activities are 
expressive in nature. From a religious liberty perspective, a sermon 
by clergy during worship services must receive maximum protection 
against state interference. Regulations denying tax-exempt status to 
congregations whose clergy endorse candidates during an election 
seems unacceptably intrusive. Conversely, from a speech 
perspective, exempting religious organizations expressing 
religious/political messages from speech regulations that all secular 
501(3)(c) non-profits must obey is prohibited viewpoint 
discrimination.31
Indeed, the reality that many religious institutions participate as 
speakers in public discourse creates an unavoidable conflict between 
these two characterizations of religion.32 From a religious liberty 
perspective, exemptions from various general regulations ranging 
from zoning to anti-discrimination laws may seem reasonable and 
28. See id. at 120.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Mutually Reinforcing Mandates, supra note 23, at 1714.
31. Alan E. Brownstein, Free Speech vs. Religion Clauses, LIBERTY MAG.,
http://www.libertymagazine.org/contributor/free-speech-vs.-religion-clauses [https://
perma.cc/X6BJ-NEUH] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
32. See id. (discussing the tension between the Establishment Clause and 
the freedom of speech).
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defensible.33 But from a freedom of speech perspective, exempting 
religious organizations from burdensome regulations that their 
secular counterparts must obey is as unacceptable as exempting 
liberal organizations from regulations that their conservative 
counterparts must obey.34 Distinctive religious accommodations are 
justifiable if religion is a particularly valued liberty interest.35 It is in 
the nature of liberty rights that some freedoms receive more 
protection than others.36 If religion is an idea and a viewpoint, then 
providing more favorable protection to religious beliefs than secular 
ideas is much more problematic, if not completely prohibited.
Similar conflicts arise when religion is conceptualized as an 
identity or class and equality concerns are taken into account.37
United States civil rights laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
religion but extend no similar protection to adherents of secular 
beliefs.38 Is this distinction permissible? Prohibiting discrimination in 
employment on the basis of religion but not on the basis of secular 
beliefs treats religion as a distinct identity and is defended as 
furthering equality values.39 Free speech review would require 
comparable protection for adherents of secular beliefs.40
Similarly, distinctive exemptions for religious institutions from 
laws prohibiting employment discrimination may be accepted as 
legitimate, if not necessary, from a religious liberty perspective.41
However, members of minority faiths denied access to job 
opportunities, some of which may be subsidized by public funds, 
may certainly experience such exclusions as a denial of basic 
equality rights.42 The weight to be assigned to these competing 
33. See Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 14, 268-78 
(discussing religious organization exemptions and the discrimination that results 
from such accommodations).
34. Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of 
Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 164-69 (2002) 
[hereinafter Protecting Religious Liberty]; Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra
note 14, at 268-78; Mutually Reinforcing Mandates, supra note 23, at 1711-16.
35. See Protecting Religious Liberty, supra note 34, at 164-69.
36. See id.
37. See e.g., William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society, and 
Speech-Based Claims for Religious Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General 
Applicability, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1937, 1939-42 (2011).
38. See Protecting Religious Liberty, supra note 34, at 164-69.
39. See Marshall, supra note 37, at 1937-42.
40. See, e.g., id.
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 14, at 257-67; 
see also School Voucher Programs, supra note 13, at 909-20.
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liberty and equality dimensions of religion is contested and 
uncertain.43
From a political rights perspective, religion and secular beliefs 
and action might be largely indistinguishable. Accordingly, religion 
would be an acceptable source of political values, a permissible 
language of political discourse, an allowable motivation of voter 
choices, a tolerated basis for political organizations, and a legitimate 
basis of legislative decision-making and the enactment of law. 
Substantive value constraints would limit the content of law from 
religious sources. For example, religious liberty values would 
prohibit mandatory adherence to particular beliefs and forms of 
worship; equality and liberty values would preclude the official 
declaration of religious truth and falsehood. Consistency with 
religious values, however, would be as acceptable a basis for 
defining ethical duties between individuals as secular values. A state 
determination regarding the moral standing of a fetus, for example, 
might be based on secular normative principles or religious belief.
There is some internal tension here with regard to political 
rights. Debate over legislation couched exclusively in majoritarian 
religious terms arguably limits political participation by religious 
minorities. If the only arguments acceptable to the legislative 
majority are based on the interpretation of scripture, non-adherents 
of the majority’s religious beliefs are relegated to making arguments 
based on premises they consider false and the acceptance of which 
they consider apostasy. 
These tensions are exacerbated when liberty and equality 
values are added to the analysis. Religious liberty is burdened when 
religious minorities and non-religious political actors must sacrifice 
their integrity and argue inauthentically in the language of a different 
faith in order to have any influence on lawmaking. Religious equality 
values are also burdened if religious minorities cannot engage in 
meaningful participation in political decision-making. Yet speech 
and political participation values support the right of members of the 
religious majority to base their expression and political conduct on 
the beliefs that most accurately and meaningfully support their 
judgments—as do adherents of secular political ideologies.
Often, the clash between values is stark. Consider the question 
of whether religious political parties are constitutionally permissible. 
43. See School Voucher Programs, supra note 13, at 878 (discussing the 
complexity of competing liberty and equality dimensions with regard to school 
vouchers).
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In the United States, as a constitutional matter, political parties are 
largely free to limit membership on the basis of basis of political or 
ideological belief and access to primaries on the basis of 
membership.44 Also, as a constitutional matter, a series of state-
action decisions hold that political parties cannot limit access to 
primary elections on the basis of racial identity.45 To do so would 
violate constitutional equality mandates.46
How then should we evaluate religious political parties that 
exclude religious minorities from membership and participation in 
primary elections? If we characterize religion as a viewpoint of 
political speech and evaluate these restrictions on access under free 
speech and freedom of association principles, religiously limited 
primaries would be unexceptional. If we characterize religion as an 
identity and evaluate access restrictions under equality mandates 
designed to protect the rights of minorities, religious exclusions are 
much more suspect.
In the United States, and I think this is generally true of liberal 
constitutionalism, there is no uniform framework for reconciling 
these conflicting values. Sometimes speech values, sometimes 
equality values, and sometimes liberty values control religion clause 
analysis. Problematically, there are no criteria available to determine 
which characterization of religion and which values and doctrinal 
frameworks should apply in particular circumstances.47
I am not sure that liberal constitutionalism in the abstract 
provides that much direction in deciding how these different 
characterizations of religion and corresponding values should be 
reconciled. Characterizing religious belief and practice as a liberty 
right and religious identity as an equality right may justify distinctive 
44. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) 
(recognizing that the First Amendment protects the freedom to associate in 
furtherance of political beliefs and to limit that association to certain people).
45. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 465, 470 (1953) (holding that 
barring participation on the basis of race in private organizations that influenced 
party primary elections operated as improper voter discrimination); Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662 (1944) (noting that the Fifteenth Amendment bars 
voter discrimination in state primaries on the basis of race). 
46. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 467 (“The [Fifteenth] Amendment bans racial 
discrimination in voting by both state and nation.”).
47. See, e.g., School Voucher Programs, supra note 13, at 887 (“Applying 
[the] multi-factor criteria [of liberty, equality, and speech] requires the exercise of 
judicial discretion and it will inevitably result in disputes about how these different 
and sometimes conflicting interests are to be evaluated in the context of specific 
facts.”).
174 Michigan State Law Review 2017
protection for religious minorities that would be unavailable if 
religion was considered as a viewpoint of speech and expressive 
association. Is distinctive protection of religion and religious 
minorities the hallmark of religion–state relationships in a liberal 
constitutional regime? Or does liberal constitutionalism require 
treating religious and secular beliefs and expressive conduct as 
comparable viewpoints of speech and expressive association? 
Can these questions be answered without regard to context? A 
country with a dominant religious majority might choose a 
constitution emphasizing religion as speech and association and 
characterize its laws as grounded in secular, democratic principles. A 
religiously pluralistic society might insist on recognizing the 
distinctive nature of religious belief and practice and religious 
identity and characterize its laws as grounded in religious principles 
of religious freedom and equality before G–d. Alternatively, one 
might argue that liberal constitutionalism requires differently 
packaged, mix-and-match patterns of value patches in a 
jurisprudential quilt tailored to a particular country’s history, culture, 
and demography. It is unclear to me that either religious belief or 
secularism provides necessary, non-negotiable direction for the 
quilters of these products.
